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ARTICLES
SON OF SCANWELL: Antitrust

Challenges to Government Contract
Awards and Related Actions
Del Stiltner Dameron*
Robert J. Sherry**
I. Introduction
Unsuccessful bidders and offerors for government contracts tra-

ditionally have had a number of available forums to challenge the
award, or proposed award, of a particular contract to another party.
The General Accounting Office (GAO) has been deciding so-called
"bid protests" since the 1920s,' and was given specific statutory authority to do so by the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984.2 The

General Services Administration Board of Contract Appeals
(GSBCA) is another administrative forum available in certain instances.' Parties seeking to challenge an award or proposed award of
* Partner, McKenna, Conner & Cuneo, Washington, D.C. B.A., 1974, Pikeville College;
J.D., 1977, University of Cincinnati. Member, District of Columbia and Ohio Bars; American
Bar Association (Sections on Antitrust and Public Contracts Law).
** Associate, McKenna, Conner & Cuneo, Washington, D.C. B.A., 1979, Dickinson College; J.D., 1982, Washington College of Law, The American University. Member, District of
Columbia Bar; American Bar Association (Sections on Antitrust and Public Contracts Law).
The authors wish to thank Richard A. Feinstein and Patrick W. Lynch for their assistance in the preparation of this article.
I. See J. CIBINIC & R. NASH, FORMATION OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS 1006 (2d ed.
1986); FEDERAL CONTRACT MANAGEMENT 1 6.05[2] (1985) [hereinafter FCM].
2. Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 1175, 1199 (1984) (pertinent parts codified at 31 U.S.C.
§§ 3551-56 (West Supp. 1986)).
3. Since 1984, the GSBCA and the GAO have had concurrent bid protest jurisdiction
over automatic data processing (ADP) procurements. See Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 2713, 98
Stat. 1175, 1182 (Codified at 40 U.S.C.A. § 759(h) (West Supp. 1986)); Pub. L. No. 99-591,
§ 831, 100 Stat. _;
FCM, supra note I, at 1 6.05[3]. Jurisdiction over ADP procurements
is limited. In Electronic Data Systems Fed. Corp. v. GSBCA, 792 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1986),
the court held that the GSBCA lacks jurisdiction over ADP protests when the underlying
procurements should have been, but were not, conducted under the Brooks Act, which governs
procurement of ADP.equipment by the federal government.
In 1986, Congress amended the Brooks Act to overrule Electronic Data Systems and
provide that the GSBCA has jurisdiction to review all procurements conducted under the
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a contract, or related contractual actions, also may do so in a federal
district court or the United States Claims Court, in what is commonly known as a "Scanwell" suit." Traditionally, these options have
not often resulted in successful challenges to contract awards because courts generally will grant substantive relief only if the agency
action lacks a rational basis.
More recently, however, some disappointed bidders and offerors
have employed a different approach. Instead of the traditional approaches above, some frustrated bidders or offerors have challenged
contract awards, proposed contract awards, and related actions
under Section 1 and/or Section 2 of the Sherman Act.5 They have
Brooks Act and those that should have been conducted under the Act. Pub. L. No. 99-591, §
824, 100 Stat. (to be codified at 40 U.S.C. § 759(f) (Supp. 1986)). See Computervision
Corp., GSBCA No. 8709-P, 87-1 BCA (CCH)
19,433. The parameters of the GSBCA's
jurisdiction in this area continue to be defined. E.g., SMC Information Systems, Inc., GSBCA
No. 8071-P, 85-3 BCA (CCH)
18,388 (GSBCA has jurisdiction over contract for ADP
technical support services).
4. In Scanwell Laboratories v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970), the court held
that unsuccessful offerors have standing under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to
seek, and that district courts are empowered to grant, injunctive relief against federal contract
awards or related actions. Prior to Scanwell and the APA, courts routinely rejected such requests for relief because they held that contractors had no legally cognizable right to compete
for government contracts. E.g., Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940). The
Scanwell line of cases holds that Perkins was implicitly reversed by the APA, which authorizes challenges to agency actions that are not in accordance with law. In 1982, the Federal
Courts Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 133, 96 Stat. 25, 40, empowered the Claims
Court to grant injunctive relief in such circumstances. It has been held, however, that this
Claims Court jurisdiction is limited to cases in which the complaint is filed before the contract
is awarded. John C. Grimberg Co. v. United States, 702 F.2d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1983), citing 28
U.S.C. §§ 1491(a)(3) (1982).
After Grimberg, a conflict arose in the courts concerning whether district courts also continue to have jurisdiction to hear such suits prior to contract award. Compare In re Smith &
Wesson, 757 F.2d 431, 435 (Ist Cir. 1985) and Coco Bros., Inc. v. Pierce, 741 F.2d 675, 679
(3d Cir. 1984) (district court pre-award jurisdiction retained) with Opal Mfg. Co. v. UMC
Industries, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 131, 133 (D.D.C. 1982) and London Fog v. Defense Logistics
Agency, No. 4 82-1334 (D. Minn, Dec. 22, 1982) (district court lacks such jurisdiction). See
also B.K. Instrument, Inc. v. United States, 715 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1983).
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1982). See, e.g., National Reporting Co. v. Alderson Reporting Co.,
763 F.2d 1020 (8th Cir. 1985); Arthur S. Langenderfer Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 729 F.2d
1050 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984); Triple M Roofing Corp. v. Tremco, Inc.,
753 F.2d 242 (2d Cir. 1985); SJ Advanced Technology and Mfg. Corp. v. Junkunc, 627 F.
Supp. 572 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Kirk-Mayer, Inc. v. Pac Ord, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 1168 (C.D. Cal.
1986); Richard Hoffman Corp. v. Integrated Bldg. Sys., 610 F. Supp. 19 (N.D. Ill. 1985); F.
Buddie Contracting, Inc. v. Seawright, 595 F. Supp. 422 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
The use of the antitrust laws by government contractors to challenge contract awards or
competitors' conduct is not wholly unprecedented. See Security Fire Door Co. v. County of
Los Angeles, 484 F.2d 1028 (9th Cir. 1973) (alleged conspiracy among architects and county
officials to draft specifications to exclude some products from competition could not constitute
antitrust violation); American Standard, Inc. v. Bendix Corp., 487 F. Supp. 265 (W.D. Mo.
1980) (allegations that contractor had monopolized and attempted to monopolize sales of
APX-72 transponders to United States withstood summary judgment because given that the
contractor had received development, initial and follow-up production contracts on a solesource basis and the "exceptional structure of the APX-72 transponder market, it [could) not
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done so on a number of theories, including predatory pricing, e con-

spiracies to restrain trade between the contractor and government
agents or personnel, and misrepresentation of a company's status or
capability.'
This article will analyze the recent cases in which the antitrust
approach has been utilized. First, the article examines the pertinent
provisions of the Sherman Act, Sections 1 and 2. Second, the article
analyzes how government contractors have attempted to define the
relevant markets allegedly affected by anticompetitive behavior.
Next, the article reviews the seminal cases in which contractors have
alleged that contract awards or related actions resulted from or were
caused by violations of Sections 1 and/or 2. Finally, the article assesses the usefulness of this approach, and concludes that antitrust
challenges generally are no more effective than the traditional vehicles for challenging government contract awards.
II.

An Introduction to Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act

A.

Section 1
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits all contracts, combina-

tions, and conspiracies that unreasonably restrain trade. 9 Conduct
generally does not violate Section 1 unless it: 1) is in or affects interstate or foreign commerce; 2) is performed by two or more persons;
be said, as a matter of law, that [it] did not possess monopoly power." 487 F. Supp. at 271);
Ovitron Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 364 F. Supp. 944 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (second lowest
bidder on contract could not recover on predatory pricing claim against successful bidder for
lack of proof that it otherwise would have obtained contract), affd, 512 F.2d 442 (2d Cir.
1975). See also Parmelee Transp. Co. v. Keeshin, 292 F.2d 794 (7th Cir. 1961). The scope of
this article, however, is confined principally to surveying the major recent cases in which this
approach has been employed.
6. See. e.g., National Reporting Co. v. Alderson Reporting Co., 763 F.2d 1020 (8th Cir.
1985).
7. See, e.g., F. Buddie Contracting, Inc. v. Seawright, 595 F. Supp. 422 (N.D. Ohio
1984).
8. SJ Advanced Technology & Mfg. Corp. v. Junkunc, 627 F. Supp. 572 (N.D. Ill.
1986). It should be noted that government contractors enjoy no special immunity from the
antitrust laws. In fact, federal procurement laws and regulations require government contracting officers and agencies to watch for potential antitrust violations by companies bidding
on government contracts, and to report collusive activity to the Department of Justice. See 10
U.S.C.A. § 2305(b)(5) (West Supp. 1987); 41 U.S.C. § 253(d) (1982); 48 C.F.R. § 3.303
(1987). In addition, Executive Order 10936, April 24, 1961, requires government agencies to
inform the Attorney General of each formally advertised procurement over $10,000 that involves identical bids. The procedures for compliance with this Executive Order are set forth at
48 C.F.R. § 3.302-2 (1987).
9. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I, 65 (1911). Section I of the Sherman Act provides that: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in the restraint of trade or commerce among several states, or with foreign nations,
is hereby declared illegal.
... 15 U.S.C. § I (1982).
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3) is the result of concerted action; 4) constitutes a restraint on trade
or commerce; and 5) is unreasonable.' 0 The shorthand term for the
examination of whether particular facts meet these elements is
known as "rule of reason analysis." Rule of reason inquiry requires a
balancing of the procompetitive and anticompetitive ramifications of

the conduct at issue, in the context of, among other things, the affected industry, the parties' intentions, the business justifications for
the conduct, and other significant factors."
Occasionally, courts condemn certain conspiracies or trade prac-

tices which are "conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and
therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm

they have caused or the business excuse for their use.'

2

These so-

called per se violations of Section 1 essentially are indefensible; the
plaintiff must prove only that conduct occurred that falls within a

per se category, and need not demonstrate the unreasonableness of
that conduct. The defendant, in turn, is barred from attempting to
demonstrate a legitimate business justification or any procompetitive
aspects of the conduct.' 3 Courts will not, however, classify challenged conduct as per se violative of Section 1 unless they have had

sufficient experience analyzing that conduct to conclude it has a
"pernicious effect on competition,""' "lack[s] any redeeming virtue," 1 5 or is a "naked restraint of trade with no purpose except stifling of competition."' 6
Traditionally, five types of market arrangements have been con-

sidered to fit within the contours of the per se doctrine. These include: 1) horizontal agreements to fix prices;' 7 2) horizontal market
10. 2 E. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 9.1 (1980).
11. See, e.g., National Soc'y of Professional Engrs. v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691

(1978); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
12. N. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. I, 5 (1958).
13.

See id.; R. HOLMES, 1986 ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK § 1.0411] (1986); ABA AN-

22-24 (1984)

[hereinafter

14. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977)
Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. I, 5 (1958)).

(quoting N.

TITRUST

SECTION,

ANTITRUST

LAW

DEVELOPMENTS

(Second)

ALD].
15. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 8 (1979), quoting N. Pac. Ry.
v. United States, 356 U.S. I, 5 (1958).
16. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963). See also NCAA v.

Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100 (1984); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1,910, 20 (1979); United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972); M&H Tire Co. v.
Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 733 F.2d 973, 977 (lst Cir. 1984); Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030, 1051-52 (9th Cir. 1983). See generally 2 E. KINTNER, supra
note 10, at § 9.20; R. HOLMES. supra note 13, at § 1.0411]; ALD, supra note 13, at 22-24.

17. See. e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 342-48 (1982);
Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 645 (1980) (per curiam); United States v.

Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940). The term horizontal price-fixing includes "bid rigging," which in-

ANTITRUST CHALLENGES TO GOVERNMENT CONTRACT AWARDS

divisions or allocations;18 3) resale price maintenance, or vertical
price fixing; 9 4) certain types of group boycotts, or concerted refusals to deal - generally those in which a group of competitive or
business affiliates combine with the intent to exclude other competitors from the market or to succeed in some other anticompetitive

purpose;" ° and 5) certain tying arrangements."
cludes conspiracies to allocate contract awards among competitors, see, e.g., United States v.
66,963 (4th Cir. 1986);
W.F. Brinkley & Son Constr. Co., 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
United States v. Portsmouth Paving Corp., 694 F.2d 312, 325 (4th Cir. 1982); comparing bids
or offers prior to submission, see, e.g., United States v. J.L. Hammet Co., 1964 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 1 71,178 (E.D. Pa. 1964); agreeing to refrain from competing for particular contracts,
see National Soc'y of Professional Engrs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692-93 (1978); Tran65,865 (5th Cir.
source Int'l Inc. v. Trinity Industries, Inc., 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
1984); United States v. Champion Int'l Corp., 557 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
938 (1977). See generally ALD, supra note 14, at 22, 32 & n.216.
In recent years, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice has conducted extensive bid rigging investigations that have resulted in a series of civil and criminal antitrust suits
against government contractors. E.g., United States v. W. F. Brinkley & Son Constr. Co.,
1986 -1 Trade Case. (CCH) 66,963 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Koppers Co., 652 F.2d
290 (2d Cir. 1981). In addition, the Department of Defense [hereinafter DOD] has added
antitrust enforcement to its broad and well-publicized campaign against fraud, waste and
abuse. Specifically, the DOD Inspector General has issued a manual, prepared in conjunction
with the Antitrust Division, providing guidance to DOD investigators concerning potential bid
rigging and related antitrust offenses by defense contractors. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT

(1987). The

manual signals DOD's growing scrutiny of procurement activities for antitrust-related consequences which can include civil and criminal penalties, as well as debarment and suspension of
contractors from eligibility for future contracts.
18. E.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972); Timken Roller
Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); Engine Specialties, Inc. v. Bombadier,
Ltd., 605 F.2d I (Ist Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 983 (1980). See also Copperweld
Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984). Horizontal market allocation
also can be considered bid rigging, see, e.g., United States v. Smith's Bakery, Inc., 1978-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62,217 (S.D. Miss. 1978); United States v. Holsum Bakery, Inc., 1978-2
Trade Cas. (CCH)
62,215 (D. Ariz. 1978).
19. E.g., Monsanto Corp. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 & n.7 (1984);
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 404-09 (1911). In Monsanto, the Reagan Administration, through the Solicitor General, urged the Court to eliminate
the per se rule with respect to resale price maintenance. The Court declined the request, because the case was tried on per se instructions, and neither party had advocated the use of rule
of reason analysis. Id. at 761-62 n.7.
20. See Larry v. Muko, Inc. v. Southwestern Pa. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 670
F.2d 421, 429-30 (3d Cir. 1982); E.A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated Air Tour Manual
Comm., 467 F.2d 178, 186-87 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973). There is a
great deal of confusion about the scope of the per se rule in the group boycott context. See
generally L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 229-30 (1977); 2 E. KINTNER, supra note 10, at §§ 10.2910.38; R. HOLMES, supra note 13, at § 1.09[1]; ALD, supra note 13, at 40-49. Two rules for
screening group boycotts, at least, generate little apparent controversy. First, it is generally
agreed that boycotts are illegal per se if they are used to enforce other agreements that are
illegal per se - such as market division or price-fixing agreements. See Kreuzer v. American
Academy of Periodontology, 735 F.2d 1479, 1491-92 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Wilk v. AMA, 719
F.2d 207, 221 (7th Cir. 1983); Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 706
F.2d 1488, 1495-96 (7th Cir. 1983), vacated on other grounds, 726 F.2d 1150 (7th Cir. 1984),
rev'd on other grounds, 470 U.S. 373 (1985). Second, a "social" or "political" boycott by a
group acting without anticompetitive intent will not be adjudged under per se standards, and
may even. be immune from Sherman Act scrutiny. See, e.g., Costello Publishing Co. v. Rotelle,
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The per se doctrine has been somewhat eroded by three recent
Supreme Court cases. In Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v.
Hyde,22 the Court reaffirmed that certain tying arrangements are per
se illegal, but suggested that per se condemnation of such arrangements is appropriate only when it is "probable" that a seller had
"forced" a number of purchasers to buy a product they would have
preferred to buy from another seller as a condition of purchasing a
second product. 23 Four justices concurred in the judgment on the basis of an opinion suggesting that tying arrangements should never be
subject to a per se analysis. 2 ' In NCAA v. Board of Regents,25 the
Court indicated that horizontal price-fixing conspiracies need not always trigger a per se finding, at least when the conspirators have
established a joint selling arrangement or other joint venture in
which "horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at all." 26 Finally, in Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co.,27 the Court concluded that a purchasing cooperative of retailers could summarily
expel a member without triggering the per se rule occasionally applicable to group boycotts.28 The Court concluded that the members
could exclude a competitor from the cooperative without due process
and still avoid per se liability so long as the cooperative did not possess market power, or membership was not "essential to effective
competition." 29
Taken together, Hyde, NCAA and Northwest Wholesale signal
670 F.2d 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Allied Int'l, Inc. v. International Longshoreman's Ass'n., 640
F.2d 1368 (Ist Cir. 1981), affd, 456 U.S. 212 (1982); Missouri v. NOW, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 849 (1980); Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Waldman, 486 F.
Supp. 759 (M.D. Pa.) rev'd on other grounds, 634 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1980). Between these two
parameters, however, is a gray area in which it is often difficult to predict whether a court will,
or should, employ per se or rule of reason analysis to an alleged group boycott, But see Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 294 (1985)
(per se treatment appropriate for group boycotts that involve "joint efforts by a firm or firms to
disadvantage competitors by either directly denying or persuading or coercing suppliers or customers to deny 'relationships the competitors need in the competitive struggle' ").
21. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9 (1984); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947); Fortner Enterprises v. United
States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 498-99 (1969).
22. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
23. Id. at 9, 15-16.
24. Id. at 35 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
25. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
26. Id. at 101. The Court nonetheless held that the NCAA had violated Section I under
rule of reason analysis. Id. at 103, 120.
27. 472 U.S. 284 (1985).
28. Id. at 298. See supra note 20.
29. Id. at 296-98. This rule apparently also applies to trade associations. See Moore v.
Boating Indus. Ass'n, 106 S. Ct. 218 (1986) (vacating and remanding 754 F.2d 698 (7th Cir.
1985) for further consideration in light of Northwest Wholesale).
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a growing judicial trend toward merging per se and rule of reason
analysis into a modified rule of reason approach to determine
0 In each of these
whether challenged conduct violates Section 1.3
cases, the Court focused upon a weighing of the procompetitive and
anticompetitive aspects of the conduct at issue.3 1 In NCAA, the
Court foreshadowed its possible synthesis of these approaches:
Both per se rules and the Rule of Reason are employed "to
form a judgment about the competitive significance of the restraint." . . . But whether the ultimate finding is the product of
a [per se] presumption or actual market analysis [under the rule
of reason], the essential inquiry remains the same - whether or
not the challenged restraint enhances competition. Under the
Sherman Act the criterion to be used in judging the validity of a
restraint on trade is its impact on competition.3"
These same decisions, however, indicate that the Court is not
yet ready to abandon per se analysis altogether. In Northwest
Wholesale, the Court reiterated that "'[tlhe per se rule is a valid
and useful tool of antitrust policy and enforcement.' "' As stated
earlier, the majority in Hyde indicated that some tying arrangements
still may be per se violative of the Sherman Act,34 despite the protestations of four of the six concurring justices. 85
Thus, government contractors alleging that contract awards or
related contractual actions violate Section 1 should be prepared to
analyze challenged conduct under both the per se rule and the rule
of reason. It is probable, however, that most Section 1 claims by
government contractors will be reviewed on a rule of reason basis.3 6
For example, in Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,37 the
Ninth Circuit rejected the district court's application of per se analysis to a "contract responsibility" clause in a teaming agreement between two defense contractors. The clause allocated prime contract
responsibilities to one contractor for land-based versions of the
30. Accord ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, Antitrust Law Developments (Second) 23-24
(Supp. 1983-86).
31. See Northwest Wholesale, 472 U.S. at 294-98; NCAA, 468 U.S. at 103-04; Hyde,
466 U.S. at 29-31; id. at 35 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
32. 468 U.S. at 103-04 (footnotes omitted).
33. 472 U.S. at 298.
34. 466 U.S. at 9-10.
35. Id. at 35 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
36. See, e.g., Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030 (9th Cir.
1983); Richard Hoffman Corp. v. Integrated Bldg. Sys., 581 F. Supp. 367, 372-73 (N.D. Ill.
1984) (granting motion to dismiss in part), later opinion 610 F. Supp. 19, 22-23 (N.D. Ill.
1985) (granting summary judgment).
37. 705 F.2d 1030 (9th Cir. 1983).
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fighter to be developed under the agreement, and to the other contractor for sea-based versions. The court rejected contentions that
the clause reflected a per se illegal horizontal market division. The
court instead asserted that because it lacked experience in evaluating

teaming agreements of this nature, rule of reason analysis would be
more appropriate.38 Indeed, the court suggested that the agreement
and clause might be more procompetitive than anticompetitive because they "allow[ed] both parties to compete in a market from
which they were otherwise foreclosed." 39 Similar considerations of
procompetitive and anticompetitive consequences have governed judicial analysis in other Section 1 cases involving government

contractors."'
B. Section 2

Unlike Section 1, which requires that the relevant acts be performed by two or more persons, 4 ' Section 2 of the Sherman Act 2
focuses primarily on offenses that can be perpetrated by a single actor. Section 2 prohibits monopolization, 43 attempted monopoliza-

tion,"" and conspiracies to monopolize

5

trade or commerce.

38. Id. at 1051-52. Northrop did not involve a challenge to a contract award, but rather
involved a dispute between two contractors performing a government contract pursuant to a
teaming agreement. For a definition and description of "teaming agreement," see 48 C.F.R. §
9.601 (1987). Contractor teaming arrangements, such as partnerships or joint ventures, are
recognized as legitimate and often are encouraged by the government. In these arrangements,
typically "used on large military projects, two or more private contractors pool their financial
and technological resources to work on a project that they would be unable to handle alone."
See Northrop, 705 F.2d at 1037, n.l.Procurement regulations, however, specify that teaming
agreements may not violate the antitrust laws. 48 C.F.R. § 9.604 (1987). For a general discussion of the antitrust rules applicable to teaming agreements, see Dees and Lindquist, Antitrust
Considerations in Government Contracting, Federal Publications Briefing Paper #83-5 (1983).
39. Northrop, 705 F.2d at 1053.
40. See Richard Hoffman Corp. v. Integrated Bldg. Sys., 581 F. Supp. 367, 372-73
(N.D. Ill. 1984); 610 F. Supp. 19, 22-23 (N.D. III. 1985).
41. See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (corporation cannot conspire with its wholly-owned subsidiary for purposes of Section 1); Domed
Stadium Hotel, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 732 F.2d 480, 486 (5th Cir. 1984). See generally 2
E. KINTNER, supra note 10, at §§ 9.7-9.16.
42. Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides that:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several states or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a felony, and on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred
thousand dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said
punishments, in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
43. E.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highland Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
44. E.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 368 (1973).
45. E.g., United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 226-27 (1947). Conspiracies to
monopolize, of course, must include two or more actors. See id.
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Monopolization consists of two elements: "(1) the possession of

monopoly power in the relevant market, and (2) willful acquisition
or maintenance of that power, as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or
historic accident." 46 The first element, monopoly power, entails "the
power to control prices or exclude competition."" 7 The second element can be shown by a number of methods of conduct, with predatory pricing being most commonly alleged in government contract
actions."'
In the usual government contract context, it is quite difficult to
actually obtain monopoly power. Typically, contracts for supplies or
services are let on a fixed-price, fixed-term basis, in which price is
the sole or primary method of selecting the awardee.4 9 Awardees
generally cannot install themselves in a permanent monopolistic position with respect to renewal or "follow-on" contracts. Thus, there is

no reason to fear attempted monopolization by a contractor "buyingin" to a contract with a low price for the original term, and then
raising its price for the renewal, because the awardee then would be

vulnerable to lower bids by competitors.50
Consequently, it seems that a contractor-plaintiff would encounter difficulty in proving a monopolization offense except, perhaps, in
two circumstances. First, if the contract were of sufficient duration
or scope that an award might result in elimination of all other actual
and potential competitors for a renewal or follow-on contract, then
possession of monopoly power might be inferred. 5 ' Thus, acquisition
of a "natural monopoly," a market "that can practically accommo46. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 595 (1985); see
also United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966)
47. United States v. E.l. du Pont & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956); see also United
States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563. 571 (1966); Central Telecommunications Inc. v. TCI
Cablevision Inc., 800 F.2d 711, 726 (8th Cir. 1986); American Standard, Inc. v. Bendix Corp.,
487 F. Supp. 265, 269 (W.D. Mo. 1980).
48. National Reporting Co. v. Alderson Reporting Co., 763 F.2d 1020, 1023 (8th Cir.
1985); Kirk-Mayer Inc. v. Pac Ord, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 1168, 1170-71 (C.D. Cal. 1986). See
Liebeler, Whither Predatory Pricing? From Areeda and Turner to Matsushita, 61 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1052 (1986).
49. See id. See also 48 C.F.R. §§ 16.104, 16.202 (1987). Government contracts are
awarded competitively through either sealed bidding or negotiation. 48 C.F.R. §§ 14.101,
15.102 (1987). Antitrust issues involving bid rigging conspiracies and predatory pricing are
more likely to arise in sealed bid procurements, in which price is the predominant award factor. Alleged conspiracies between contractors and government agents to "wire" a contract
award are more likely to arise in negotiated procurements, in which price is generally one of
several factors governing award.
50. See National Reporting Co. v. Alderson Reporting Co., 763 F.2d 1020, 1023-24
(8th Cir. 1985); Kirk-Mayer, Inc. v. Pac Ord, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 1168, 1171 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
51. See National Reporting, 763 F.2d at 1023-24; Kirk-Mayer, 626 F. Supp. at 117071.
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date only one competitor," could violate Section 2 if it were achieved
by anticompetitive means such as predatory pricing. 52 Second, a contractor which developed a particular product under a government
contract and then received a number of sole-source production contracts for the product might be able to exclude competition through
manipulating the specifications in the early phases of the program,

or creating proprietary information or other significant entry
barriers."3
Attempted monopolization reaches conduct that falls short of
acquiring actual monopoly power and would therefore not support a
monopolization charge. Attempted monopolization is defined as the
"employment of methods, means and practices which would, if successful, accomplish monopolization, and which, though falling short,
nevertheless approach so close as to create a dangerous probability of

it."5 In addition to anticompetitive conduct, it must be shown that55
the defendant intended that its acts would secure monopoly power.
Most courts also require a "dangerous probability of success" of attaining monopoly power to establish an attempt to monopolize. 5
Specific intent to monopolize need be only cursorily alleged at
the pleading stage to survive a defendant's motion to dismiss an attempted monopolization charge. 57 Actual proof of specific intent may
52. See id.; United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429-31 (2d Cir.
1945); Ovitron Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 295 F. Supp. 373, 377 & n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
53. See American Standard, Inc. v. Bendix, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 265, 270 (W.D. Mo.
1980). See also Ovitron Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 364 F. Supp. 944, 947 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), aff'd, 512 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1975).
54. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 785 (1946); Swift & Co. v.
United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905). See generally Ponsoldt, Clarifying the Attempt to
Monopolize Offense as an Alternative to Protectionist Legislation, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1109, 1112-29 (1986).
55. ALD, supra note 13, at 139-40; 2 E. KINTNER, supra note 10, at § 13.1.
56. E.g., National Reporting Co. v. Alderson Reporting Co., 763 F.2d 1020, 1025 (8th
Cir. 1985); Richter Concrete Corp. v. Hilltop Corp., 691 F.2d 818, 823 (6th Cir. 1982); see
HOLMES, supra note 14, at § 2.04; 2 E. KINTNER, supra note I, at § 13.1 It is not certain
whether the Ninth Circuit requires that a dangerous probability of success be shown. In Lessig
v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964), the court
held that a dangerous probability of success requirement has been regarded as an indispensable element of an attempted monopolization claim. See William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v.
ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1027 (9th Cir.) (as amended), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 825 (1982); Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 853 (9th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978).
57. See SJ Advanced Technology & Mfg. Corp. v. Junkunc, 627 F. Supp. 572, 578
(N.D. III. 1986). The plaintiff alleged:
Defendant made these false representations [about plaintiffs capabilities]
for the sole purpose of deterring [customers] . . . from doing business with
[plaintiff] and depriving it of income from the manufacture and sale of seals,
and of maintaining [defendant's] own status as sole manufacturer and supplier
of seals in the United States.
This was held to be a sufficient allegation of an intent to monopolize.
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be accomplished through use of direct evidence, but it is more often

proven through "circumstantial evidence such as by inference from
predatory conduct and market power."" 8 In Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,59 for example, a combination was used. Direct evidence of intent consisted of memoranda prepared by the de-

fendant's top executives, while indirect evidence in the record
demonstrated that the defendant possessed great leverage in the relevant market. This evidence was sufficient to withstand the defendant's motion for summary judgment.10
Similarly, little evidence of "dangerous probability of success"
is required at the pleading stage to avoid a motion to dismiss.6"
When the merits are reached, however, contractor plaintiffs alleging
attempts to monopolize encounter the same difficulty inherent in monopolization cases. If the contract is the usual fixed-term, fixed-price
contract, or is one that goes out for bids at the end of its term unless

the incumbent contractor agrees to renew it at the same price, then
it is doubtful that there will be a dangerous probability of successful

monopolization found, especially if there are competitors in the market available to bid on renewal or follow-on contracts.6 2
The elements of conspiracies to monopolize generally include: 1)

the existence of a combination or conspiracy; 2) an overt act or acts
in furtherance of this conspiracy; 3) an effect on a "significant" or
"substantial" amount of interstate commerce; and 4) specific intent
to monopolize.6" Proof of a combination or conspiracy is most critical.64 The specific intent of the conspirators can be proven directly or
circumstantially, as in the offense of attempt to monopolize.65 A
58. Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030, 1058 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1983); see R. HOLMES, supra note 13, at § 2.03; 2 E. KINTNER, supra
note 10, at § 11.09; ALD, supra note 13, at 139-40.
59. 705 F.2d 1030 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1983).
60. Id.
61. See SJ Advanced Technology & Mfg. Corp. v. Junkunc, 627 F. Supp. 572, 579
(N.D. III. 1986). In that case, plaintiff alleged that until it was formed, defendant "was the
sole source and supplier of these seals in the United States," and made the conclusory assertion that "[defendant] will monopolize the seals' market in the United States." The court
found this was sufficient to fulfill the dangerous probability of success requirement at the
pleading stage.
62. See National Reporting Co. v. Alderson Reporting Co., 763 F.2d 1020, 1025 (8th
Cir. 1985); Kirk-Mayer, Inc. v. Pac Ord, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 1168, 1171-72 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
63. See, e.g., Yellow Cab Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 218 (1947). For slight judicial
variations in this standard, see R. HOLMES, supra note 13, at § 2.04[3]; American Tobacco Co.
v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
64. Hudson Valley Asbestos Corp. v. Tougher Plumbing & Heating Co., 510 F.2d 1140,
1144 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 921 (1975); Humboldt Bay Municipal Water Dist. v.
Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 608 F. Supp. 562, 568-69 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
65. See, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 612 n.l
(1977).
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plaintiff attempting to prove the existence of a conspiracy need not
establish the "dangerous probability of success" that most courts require of a plaintiff urging that a defendant attempted to monopolize
a relevant market.66
If an unsuccessful bidder or offeror protests a contract award on

antitrust grounds, it often may be challenging only the conduct of
the successful bidder, and therefore makes a claim under Section 2. 7
Occasionally, the unsuccessful bidder has alleged that the contract

awardee and another party, such as a government official or agent,
have engaged in conduct that is prohibited by Section 1.68 In either

type of action, proof of a relevant market generally is a necessary
element of the claim which can pose special problems for government contractors.
III.

Defining the Relevant Market
For a contractor to be successful in a Sherman Act action

against a successful bidder or offeror, it must be able to demonstrate
antitrust injury resulting from conduct prohibited by Section 1 or
Section 2 that occurred within a relevant market.6 9 In a Section 2

case, "[w]ithout a definition of that [relevant] market there is no
way to measure . . .[a defendant's] . . .ability to lessen or destroy
competition." 7 0 The relevant market must also be defined in a Sec-

tion 1 case as part of proving that certain conduct unreasonably restrains trade. 71 In cases involving conduct that amounts to a per se

violation of Section 1, however, the relevant market apparently need
not be defined."
66. See Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Ragu Foods, Inc., 627 F.2d 919, 926 (9th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 921 (1981); Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459, 474 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964).
67. E.g., National Reporting Co. v. Alderson Reporting Co., 763 F.2d 1020 (9th Cir.
1985); Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 729 F.2d 1050 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984).
68. Richard Hoffman Corp. v. Integrated Bldg. Sys., 610 F. Supp. 19 (N.D. III. 1985);
F. Buddie Contracting, Inc. v. Seawright, 595 F. Supp. 422 (N.D. Ohio 1984). The federal
government and its officials and agents are immune from Sherman Act liability. See Sea-Land
Service, Inc. v. Alaska R.R., 659 F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
69. See generally Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477
(1977).
70. Walker Process Equipment Corp. v. Ford Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177
(1965); see Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 595-96 (1985);
Domed Stadium Hotel, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 732 F.2d 480, 487 (5th Cir. 1984).
71. E.g., Davis-Watkins Co. v. Service Merchandise, 686 F.2d 1190, 1195-96 (6th Cir.
1982); Fleer Corp. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 658 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1019 (1982); see 2 E. KINTNER, supra note 10, at § 16.4.
72. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100 (1984); Jefferson Parish Hosp.
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An antitrust plaintiff does not have unlimited latitude in defining the relevant market. For the Sherman Act to be invoked, the
conduct must affect interstate commerce in some significant fashion.
The Supreme Court has held that the Sherman Act proscribes only
those activities that affect a "not insubstantial amount" or an "appreciable part" of interstate commerce.73 Therefore, a plaintiff must
allege a relevant market that is large enough, or economically significant enough, to come within the protections of the Sherman Act.
In the government contracting arena, a relevant market that
will meet this requirement is often hard to define."" A government
contractor supplies its goods and services to a very few customers,
and it is often the case that the conduct at issue is in connection with
only one contract. 5 It is in the context of a single contract that a
contractor which seeks to challenge government procurement actions
on antitrust grounds often has the most difficulty.
Indeed, courts have been hesitant to allow a single contract to
define a relevant market for purposes of the Sherman Act. In Triple
M Roofing Corp. v. Tremco, Inc.,70 the court held that a single gov-

ernment contract for the roof repair of one building was not a market "sufficiently 'appreciable' " to support a claim of attempted monopolization under Section 2." The plaintiff asserted that the
relevant market consisted of roofing materials to be used in connection with the contract. The court simply found this market too small
"to implicate the economic concerns that properly animate the Sherman Act's proscriptions. "78
The Second Circuit's approach in Triple M Roofing was implicitly endorsed in Kirk-Mayer, Inc. v. Pac Ord, Inc.7 9 In that case, the

contract at issue was for repair of electronics equipment at a naval
Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. I,15-16 (1984); cf. 2 E. KINTNER, supra note 10, at § 16.4.
73. See. e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,11 (1958); United States
v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 225 (1947); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I,
61 (1911); Triple M Roofing Corp. v. Tremco, Inc., 753 F.2d 242, 246 (2d Cir. 1985). See
generally 2 E. KINTNER, supra note 10, at § 16.4; United States v. E.I.
duPont de Nemours &
Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1948).
74. For a more detailed examination of the difficulty of defining the relevant market in
Section 2 cases involving government contracts, see McMillan, Special Problems in Section 2
Sherman Act Cases Involving Government Procurement, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 689 (1983) [hereinafter McMillan),
75. E.g., Triple M Roofing Corp. v. Tremco, Inc., 753 F.2d 242 (2d Cir. 1985); KirkMayer Inc. v. Pac Ord, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 1168 (C.D. Cal. 1986); F. Buddie Contracting, Inc.
v. Seawright, 595 F. Supp. 422 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
76. 753 F.2d 242 (2d Cir. 1985).
77. Id. at 246.
78. Id.
79. 626 F. Supp. 1168 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
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facility, along with four "peripheral" contracts related to the main
contract. The court characterized the plaintiff's claim as involving a
single contract plus the four "peripheral" contracts. The plaintiff
also defined a relevant geographic market to include the area within
a 15-mile radius of the facility. Although the court accepted this
definition for the purposes of ruling on the defendant's motion for
summary judgment, the court indicated that it was "quite skeptical
'
of the proffered market definition."80
A single contract market claim prevailed, however, in F. Buddie
Contracting, Inc. v. Seawright.8 In Seawright, the plaintiff instituted a Section 1 action against two defendants, the successful bidder on a contract to build a solid waste transfer station for the city
of Cleveland and the city's consultant that reviewed the actual contract bids and made a recommendation for award of the contract to
the successful bidder. The plaintiff defined the relevant market to
consist of the single contract on which it had made an unsuccessful
bid. On the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the court
held that the plaintiff had raised an issue of fact concerning the effect of the defendant's activities in a relevant market. The court declined to follow the rule of Havoco of America, Ltd. v. Shell Oil Co.,
in which it was held that the "loss by the plaintiff of a single contract with a single purchaser is simply not equivalent to a deleterious
effect on the market. 8 2 Instead, the court held that when "a firm
succeeds in tampering with the competitive bidding process in such a
manner that competitive bidding becomes a farce, the court believes
that an unreasonable restraint of trade has occurred." 8 Implicit in
this statement is the court's determination that a single contract
could be tantamount to a relevant market. 84 The court did, however,
state that the plaintiff would have to produce economic analysis to
support its claim that the contract was a relevant market.85
The potentially different outcomes of Seawright and Triple M
80. Id. at 1170 n.2.
81. 595 F. Supp. 422 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
82. 626 F.2d 549, 558 (7th Cir. 1980). Havoco was not a government contracts case;
rather, it involved coal sales and commissions. It appears that, in many cases, courts have
ruled that a single non-government contract is simply an insufficient market to trigger Sherman Act review. See, e.g., H.E. Fletcher Co. v. Rock of Ages Corp., 326 F.2d 13, 17 (2d Cir.
1963) (remanded for consideration of whether the contract constituted an "appreciable part"
of the market); Parmelee Transp. Co. v. Keeshin, 292 F.2d 794 (7th Cir. 1961) (holding that
not every incidental effect of contract dealings constitutes a violation of the Sherman Act).
83. 595 F. Supp. at 437, citing Richard Hoffman Corp. v. Integrated Building Sys., 581
F. Supp. 367 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
84. See id. Interestingly, in a later opinion the court in Hoffman indicated some doubt
about the vitality of a single-contract market. 610 F. Supp. 19, 24 (N.D. III. 1985).
85. 595 F. Supp. at 438.
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Roofing can be reconciled because it seems that neither court followed any sort of bright-line rule concerning whether a single contract constitutes a relevant market. Both decisions suggest that the
correct approach is to analyze the facts of the given case to determine whether a single contract can have enough of an anticompetitive effect to invoke the jurisdiction of the Sherman Act.
The courts thus seemingly are divided as to whether, in some
s
circumstances, a single contract can constitute a relevant market; o
they attack the problem through a case-by-case analysis. A case-bycase approach seems to be consistent with market definition analysis
in most non-government contract cases. A relevant market is normally defined by the specification of the product(s) and geographic
area(s) that are included within it.8 7 The cases dealing with the
question of a relevant product market provide a myriad of guidelines
which can be employed to determine whether a given single contract
may constitute a relevant market.88 Often, in government procurements, the relevant market can be "defined in terms of a specific,
'
government specified product." 89
Thus, defining a relevant product market is usually not a barrier
to an unsuccessful bidder pursuing an antitrust action. In any event,
the standard for the inclusion of products in a relevant product market is one of "reasonable interchangeability." 9 0 Therefore, the prod-

ucts offered by the defendant and plaintiff need not be the same, but
they must have sufficient competitive impact on each other to be
considered collectively in deciding whether an antitrust violation exists. 91 For a contractor plaintiff in a private antitrust suit, it is usually easy to have its product or service included in the same relevant
market as that of the defendant. Because the two contractors issued

bids or proposals for the same contract, and both contractors intend
them to meet the same contractual requirements, the products or
services offered are likely to be very similar, if not identical.9 2 More86. See supra notes 76-85 and accompanying text.
87. 2 E. KINTNER, supra note 10, at § 12.2.
88. See id. at § 12.3 and cases cited.
89. McMillan, supra note 74, at 692, citing Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 498 F. Supp. 1112, 1123 (C.D. Cal. 1980), revd in part on other grounds, 705 F.2d
1030 (9th Cir. 1983); American Standard, Inc. v. Bendix, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 265, 270 (W.D.
Mo. 1980); Ovitron Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 295 F. Supp. 373, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1969),
affid per curiam, 512 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1975).
90. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962); United States v. E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956); Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp., 527 F.
Supp. 86, 89 (E.D,N.Y.), affd, 665 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1981).
91. 2 E. KINTNER, supra note 10, at § 12.3.
92. See National Reporting Co. v. Alderson Reporting Co., 763 F.2d 1020 (8th Cir.
1985) (relevant product market was the provision of court reporting services to the United
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over, because the contract generally calls for the type of product or
service desired with some specificity, the requirement that both the
plaintiff's and the defendant's goods or services be within the same
relevant product market should frequently be met.
Any definition of the relevant geographic market must take into

account the "commercial realities" of the situation and must be "economically significant." 9 For a government contractor, defining a
relevant geographic market that meets these criteria is not always
easy.9 Indeed, this might be the biggest obstacle to defining a rele-

vant market for the government contractor that is only concerned
with one contract. Kirk-Mayer, Inc. v. Pac Ord, Inc., for example,
suggests that a single contract to provide goods or services at a single
discrete facility is not sufficient to fulfill the relevant geographic

market requirement.9 5 But if a single contract provides service to a
wider area, then it may meet this requirement.9 6

Proof of an actual or even a potential overseas market for the
product specified in the challenged solicitation or contract may further enhance a government contractor plaintiff's chance of meeting
the relevant market requirement. In Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., the Ninth Circuit took a broad view of the relevant

geographic market for the F-18 fighter, agreeing with the district
court that it was "arguably the world."197 The F-18 was being marketed overseas at the time, but not on a global basis. One interpretation of the court's reasoning is that it was concerned with the potential geographic market, since it seemed to agree that the market for
States Tax Court); Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030, (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1983) (relevant product market was the F-18 fighter); KirkMayer, Inc. v. Pac Ord, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 1168 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (relevant services market
was the market for five specific interrelated maintenance and repair services for Naval electronic equipment.).
93. 2 E. KINTNER, supra note 10, at § 12.4. Interestingly, this standard was established
in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324-34 (1962), which was not a Sherman
Act case, but rather a case arising under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982).
Section 7 prohibits mergers or acquisitions when the effect of such action "may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly." Id. The market definition principles
in each case, however, are the same.
94. See Kirk-Mayer, Inc. v. Pac Ord, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 1168, 1170 n.2 (C.D. Cal.
1986); supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text. But cf. McMillan, supra note 74, at 691
(assuming that geographic market in defense procurements is almost always easily defined as
worldwide or national, rather than regional or local).
95. See 626 F. Supp. at 1170 n.2; see also Parmelee Transp. Co. v. Keeshin, 292 F.2d
794 (7th Cir. 1961).
96. National Reporting Co. v. Alderson Reporting Co., 763 F.2d 1020 (8th Cir. 1985)
(relevant geographic market was the United States Tax Court, which sits nationwide); SJ
Advanced Technology & Mfg. Corp. v. Junkunc, 627 F. Supp. 572 (N.D. II. 1986) (relevant
market defined to be the United States Arnied Forces).
97. 705 F.2d 1030, 1055 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1983).
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the F-18 was the world when the aircraft was only being sold to
certain foreign countries. A more likely reading of the case, however,
would be that the actual geographic market, which could be more
narrowly drawn to include only the United States government and
certain foreign governments, was sufficient to invoke Sherman Act
jurisdiction.
IV. Section 1 Challenges
When a government contractor sues a successful bidder under
Section 1, it must allege unlawful conduct performed by two or more
persons. 98 In the recent cases, this has been conduct by the successful bidder and the government entity making the contract," or one
of its agents.1"' For example, in Richard Hoffman Corp. v. Integrated Building Systems,"0 ' the plaintiff unsuccessfully competed for

a village contract to remodel a public recreation center. The
awardee, in turn, had prepared architectural drawings and specifications for the remodeling contract, including brand-name specifications 0 ' for certain construction materials, under a previous contract
with the village. Perhaps by coincidence, the awardee was the sole
local distributor for the specified materials.103 The plaintiff also asserted that the village gave the awardee extra time to prepare its bid
and claimed that, as a result of these and other actions, the awardee
and the village had conspired to restrain trade in violation of Section
1.104

In an initial decision confirming defendant's motion to dismiss,
the court dismissed the village as a defendant under the "state action

doctrine."''

8

The court ruled, however, that a conspiracy to restrain

98. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
99. Richard Hoffman Corp. v. Integrated Bldg. Sys., 581 F. Supp. 367 (N.D. II. 1984)
(contractor sued village which had put out a contract for the construction of a village recreation center.).
100. F. Buddie Contracting, Inc. v. Seawright, 595 F. Supp. 422 (N.D. Ohio 1984)
(contractor sued consulting company hired by the city of Cleveland).
101. 581 F. Supp. 367 (N.D. IIl. 1984), later opinion, 610 F. Supp. 19 (N.D. IIl. 1985).
102. For a discussion of some of the potential antitrust consequences of specifying
brand-name materials in government procurements, see infra notes 167-76 and accompanying
text.
103. 581 F. Supp. at 368-69.
104. Id. at 369. The plaintiff also alleged that the parties concealed the awardee's intention to bid on the remodeling contract by failing to provide that information in a standard
industry publication and in violation of the custom, usage, and practice of the local construction industry. Id.
105. The state action doctrine immunizes municipalities from antitrust liability for their
conduct when that conduct is undertaken pursuant to a "clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed state policy." Id. at 370-72; see Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,
455 U.S. 40, 52 (1982): Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). See also 15 U.S.C. §§ 35-36
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trade between village officials and the awardee could constitute a
Section 1 violation:
A firm which prepared specifications and specifies the use
of a particular product which it distributes may indeed be able
to tailor the specifications to its advantage for purposes of subsequent bidding, which might in turn discourage competitive bidding by other parties. At present, we are unprepared to hold
that Hoffman will be unable to present evidence that there was
collusion with respect to the bidding process between Integrated
and the Village.' 6
Yet, on defendant's motion for summary judgment the court
dismissed the complaint. The court noted that it had initially denied
the defendant's motion to dismiss because of its concern that the
awardee's specification of the brand-name materials it distributed
might eliminate competition. Applying rule of reason analysis,"0 7 the
court explained that because the specifications permitted plaintiff to
submit a bid based on products equal to the brand-name product
distributed by the awardee and incorporated in the specifications, the
conduct of the village and the awardee did not constitute a Section 1
violation.' 8 Presumably then, the Hoffman court may have found a
more restrictive specification, if agreed upon by the awardee and the
village with some anticompetitive purpose or effect, to constitute an
unreasonable restraint. 0 9 The court did indicate that a conspiracy to
direct the renovation contract to the awardee could constitute a per
se violation of Section 1.11 °
A plaintiff with strong evidence of collusion survived a summary
judgment motion in F. Buddie Contracting,Inc. v. Seawright."' In
Seawright the plaintiff was a competitor for a contract to build a
solid waste transfer station for the city of Cleveland. The defendants
included a consulting company which prepared specifications and re(Supp. III 1985) (exempting local governments from treble damages liability).
106. 581 F. Supp. at 374.
107. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
108. 581 F. Supp. at 23. The court also explained that the portion of the awardee's bid
which specified brand-name materials was $24,000 higher than the corresponding portion of
plaintiff's bid. Thus, because the awardee's bid was low in the aggregate, the court correctly
reasoned that the awardee derived no actual benefit from specifying the brand-name product it
distributed. Id.
109. Cf. Triple M Roofing Corp. v. Tremco, Inc., 753 F.2d 242, 247-48 (2d Cir. 1985)
(no evidence that government and consultant conspired in violation of Section I to require
contractor to use only consultant's brand-name product in performing public contract). See
infra notes 167-76 and accompanying text.
110. 610 F. Supp. at 24. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
III. 595 F. Supp. 422 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
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viewed bids for the contract, and another company which was the
awardee. When the consulting company reviewed the bids, it found
plaintiff to be the low bidder, but recommended that the city disqualify the plaintiff's bid as defective. The city accepted the
recommendation.

2

After the contract had been awarded, press revelations and a
subsequent prosecution disclosed an unlawful relationship between
the consulting company hired by the city and the awardee. The consulting company president was a close business associate of the
awardee's president. Both individuals and the consulting company
were indicted on criminal charges arising out of the contract award.
All pleaded guilty to attempting to have, or actually having, an un-

lawful interest in a public contract." 3
On the basis of evidence from the criminal proceeding, plaintiff
instituted a Section 1 action. Plaintiff alleged in its complaint that
the defendants, presumably including the consulting company, the

awardee, the presidents of those two companies, and, perhaps the
city,"" conspired to rig the award of the contract in violation of Section 1." 5 Defendants moved for summary judgment. The court denied the motion on all grounds proffered by the defendants." 6 The
court emphasized that when "a firm succeeds in tampering with the

competitive bidding process in such a manner that competitive bidding becomes a farce . . . an unreasonable restraint of trade has
occurred."' 1"7 Accordingly, the court indicated that a contractor may
recover Section 1 damages upon proof of a conspiracy between an
awardee and a government official or agent to "wire" the procure-

ment for the awardee, resulting in antitrust injury to the
contractor."'
112. Id. at 425.
113. Id. at 425-26.
114. The district court's opinion does not specifically identify the defendants. See id.
115. Id. at 426.
116. Among other things, the court rejected defendants' claims that plaintiff lacked
standing, had failed to allege a relevant market, and had failed to state a Section 1 claim, and
that defendants were immune from antitrust liability under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
See id. at 431-39. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine is discussed at length in note 176 infra.
117. Id. at 437, citing Richard Hoffman Corp. v. Integrated Bldg. Sys., 581 F. Supp.
367 (N.D. III. 1984). See supra note 83.
118. See 595 F. Supp. at 436-39. A plaintiff must demonstrate antitrust injury to have
standing to sue under the Sherman Act. In this respect, the Court has noted that the antitrust
laws are intended "for 'the protection of competition, not competitors.'" Brunswick Corp. v.
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (emphasis in original); see 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1982). Similarly, a plaintiff must demonstrate standing to maintain an action for injunctive
relief under the Scanwell doctrine. See supra note 4. See, e.g., CACI Inc. - Federal v.
United States, 719 F.2d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424
F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Onan Corp. v. United States, 476 F. Supp. 428, 432 (D. Minn.
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To successfully demonstrate antitrust injury under the court's
analysis, however, an unsuccessful bidder or offeror would have to
prove "that 'but for' the allegedly unlawful conduct of the defendants, [plaintiff] would have received the award of the [contract]."" 9
Such proof may be difficult to adduce in many cases - particularly
when the public agency at issue inserts a provision in the solicitation
for bids or proposals that reserves to the agency the right to reject all
bids or offers. Such provisions are not uncommon. 2 ' Thus, even if a
contractor-plaintiff can surmount the initial hurdle of proving the existence of a Section 1 conspiracy to "wire" a procurement for a competitor, it may face an equally difficult obstacle - demonstrating
antitrust injury.
V. Section 2 Challenges
Government contractors challenging competitors' conduct, contract awards, or related actions under Section 2 have employed three
major theories. First, some contractors have claimed that their successful competitors have engaged in predatory pricing, pricing below
cost, in order to receive government contract awards and to exclude,
or attempt to exclude, others from the relevant market.121 Second, it
has been urged that a contractor's success in persuading a government agency to adopt specifications requiring use of the contractor's
brand-name product constitutes an attempt to monopolize proscribed
by Section 1.122 Finally, it has been asserted that a contractor's disparagement of a competitor's capabilities and status also may constitute an attempt to monopolize. 2 ' Each of these three theories is addressed below.
A.

Predatory Pricing

As previously mentioned, predatory pricing is a type of conduct
that can be prohibited by Section 1 or Section 2 of the Sherman
1979).
119. Seawright, 595 F. Supp. at 433.
120. See id. at 433 (plaintiff raised issues of material fact regarding whether city would
have exercised option to reject all bids if it could not award contract to the defendantawardee); 48 C.F.R. §§ 14.201, 14.404(c), 52.214-10(b), 52.214-19(b) (1986).
121. Predatory pricing also can constitute a violation of Section I. See infra notes 12425 and accompanying text. Usually courts focus on the Section 2 aspects of predatory pricing
in the absence of evidence of conspiracy between offerors or between an offeror and the
government.
122. Triple M Roofing Corp. v. Tremco, Inc., 753 F.2d 242 (2d Cir. 1985).
123. SJ Advanced Technology & Mfg. Corp. v. Junkunc, 627 F. Supp. 572 (N.D. Ill.
1986).
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Act. 1"' In government contract cases, however, it arises most frequently in the Section 2 context.

in both monopolization

cases126

25

Predatory pricing can be alleged

to show willfulness, and attempted

monopolization cases,1 27 to show specific intent.
Predatory pricing is pricing below appropriate measures of cost,
designed to drive the competition out of the market so that the remaining firm or firms will have a monopoly and will be able to
recoup its past losses by substantial price hikes. 2 8 An unsuccessful
bidder or offeror that wishes to challenge a below-cost bid must do

so under an antitrust theory; there is no legal basis in government
contract law to object to a below-cost bid.

29

Nor does pricing below

cost, without more, violate the Sherman Act. 3 °
In determining whether predatory pricing has occurred, courts
attempt to discern whether the motive for the defendant's price reduction was to eliminate rivals and create a market that would en-

able the defendant to recoup its losses, or instead, was taken for
some competitive reason.' 31 This, in turn, often requires examination
of possible indicia of intent. Because intent is often difficult to dis-

cern, economic criteria are often used to create a presumption for, or
against, a finding of predatory pricing.
In the premier commentary on this subject, Professors Phillip
Areeda and Donald Turner put forth a relatively simple standard to
determine whether predatory pricing exists: Pricing below marginal
or average variable cost is conclusively presumed predatory, while
pricing above this level is conclusively presumed to be legal. 32 Mar124. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348
(1986); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 230-31 (Ist Cir. 1983);
Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1031.
125. E.g., National Reporting Co. v. Alderson Reporting Co., 763 F.2d 1020 (8th Cir.
1985); Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 729 F.2d 1050 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984).
126. E.g., National Reporting Co. v. Alderson Reporting Co., 763 F.2d 1020 (9th Cir.
1985).
127. E.g., Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 729 F.2d 1050 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984).
128. E.g., Zenith, 106 S. Ct. at 1355, 1357; National Reporting, 763 F.2d at 1023.
129. Western Waste Management, Comp. Gen. B-216392, 84-2 CPD 344; Technical
Food Services, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-210024, 82-2 CPD 563.
130. Liebeler, supra note 48, at 1055. In certain circumstances, however, pricing below
cost may violate the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1982). A discussion of the Act is
beyond the scope of this article. See generally ALD, supra note 13, at 219-75; R. HOLMES,
supra note 13, at §§ 3.02-3.06.
131. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1357
(1986); William Inglis v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982).
132. Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing & Related Practices Under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975) [hereinafter Areeda & Turner]. Cf. R. HOLMES,
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ginal cost is the cost to the contractor of the last unit of a given
product to be produced, while average variable cost is the per unit
measure of the costs that vary with changes in the output of a given
product. For example, labor and the cost of raw materials are variable costs, while costs that do not depend on production volume, such
as rent, are fixed costs."'
In William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking.Co.,13 4 the Ninth Circuit modified the "Areeda/Turner" rule so
that if the defendant's prices are above average total cost, defined as
the sum of variable and fixed costs, the plaintiff bears the burden of
showing that the defendant's pricing was predatory. In such a case,
plaintiff essentially must show some type of predatory intent.'3 5 If
the plaintiff proves that the defendant's prices, on the other hand,

were below average variable cost, it then has established a prima
facie case of predatory pricing, and the burden shifts to the defendant to show that its conduct was not intended to have a destructive
effect on competitors. 3 6
In Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co.,

37

the

Sixth Circuit adopted the Ninth Circuit's approach. The plaintiffs
and defendants in Langenderfer were government contractors in the
business of supplying paving materials and services for highway construction and repair in northwest Ohio. The plaintiffs claimed that
the defendants sought to eliminate them as competitors and to dominate the market through a variety of anticompetitive activities, 3 8 in-

cluding predatory pricing in a series of bids for state paving
contracts. '9
Plaintiffs' predatory pricing approach in Langenderfer was a curious one. The plaintiffs argued that the defendants "intentionally
supra note 13, at § 2.06 (competitive conditions may be such that a price set below a firm's
average total cost may be exclusionary, even though above firm's average variable cost). For a
comprehensive yet succinct discussion of the varying cost methodologies available to prove
predation, see ALD, supra note 13, at 125-30.
133. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 132, at 732-33.
134. William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014,
1035-36 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982).
135. Id. See Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1377, 1388 (9th Cir.
1983) (if prices exceed average total cost, "plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence . . .that the defendant's pricing policy was predatory").
136. William Inglis v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982).
137. 729 F.2d 1050 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984).
138. Plaintiff alleged numerous monopolistic acts in violation of Section 2, including
price discrimination, exclusive dealing, refusals to deal and tying arrangements. Id. at 1054.
139. Id. at 1055. The parties stipulated that the relevant market was asphalt highway
paving contracts awarded by the state in a thirteen-county area of northwest Ohio. Id. at 1053.
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and consistently bid below the cost levels of smaller competitors."'1 0
Although defendants never bid below their own average total cost,
they supposedly engaged in predatory behavior "by forcing competitors to choose between foregoing sales or operating at a loss."141
The district court action resulted in a jury verdict for plaintiffs,
but the Sixth Circuit determined that the district court erred in failing to grant defendants a directed verdict on the predatory pricing
issue. 14 2 The court of appeals stressed that:
[The defendant] continually made profits on its ventures.
This is not a case where the defendant failed to account for his
long term overhead costs in making his bids. The bids were
above the total average costs. To require that Johnson's bids be
above competitors' costs would deprive Johnson (and others similarly situated) of reward from greater efficiency .

. .

. Johnson

cannot be found to have committed predatory pricing simply because it was more cost efficient than its competitors and could
afford to submit a lower bid on the jobs in question . . . . We
hold . . . that as a matter of law, Sherman Act liability cannot
be premised on alleged predatory pricing without some evidence
that a defendant has charged prices below its total cost for the
product sold.' 13
Under the modification of the Areeda/Turner rule announced in
Inglis and espoused in Langenderfer, a claim of predatory pricing
cannot be supported by motive alone. Rather, such a claim must be
based at the very least upon evidence that the prices charged are
below average total cost, and even then the plaintiff has the burden
of showing that the defendant's pricing was in fact predatory. Such a
strong showing is often difficult because it is basically a showing of
intent. Under Inglis and Langenderfer, the plaintiff is in a much better position if it could show that a defendant's pricing was below
average variable cost, because this showing would shift the evidentiary burden to the defendant to demonstrate that its conduct was
not anticompetitive.""
Other contractors alleging predatory pricing in government
procurements have not fared any better. In National Reporting Co.
v. Alderson Reporting Co.,145 the plaintiff and defendant competed
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 1056.
Id.
Id. at 1055.
Id. at 1055-56, 1058.
See supra note 136 and accompanying text.

145.

763 F.2d 1020 (8th Cir. 1985).
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for the 1980 United States Tax Court contract for court-reporting
services. The court's policy was to solicit bids for those services annually unless the incumbent contractor had performed satisfactorily
and did not wish to raise its prices. In such a case, the court renewed
the incumbent's contract instead. 4 6 The plaintiff held the contract
from 1972 through 1979 but decided to raise its prices in 1980.1,4
Defendant won the 1980 contract with a bid that was about 75%
lower than the plaintiff's bid and the plaintiff ceased operations
shortly thereafter.14 8
At trial, plaintiff argued that the defendant bid far below cost
to receive the award, and intended to recoup its losses in follow-on
contracts with the court. Specifically, plaintiff contended that defendant sought through anticompetitive means to acquire a natural
monopoly, thereby committing monopolization and attempted monopolization in violation of Section 2.1"
This argument was persuasive in the trial court, but not in the
Eighth Circuit. The court of appeals reversed the district court's
finding of Section 2 liability, employing a common-sense analysis
with respect to monopolization:
Even if we assume that Alderson's pricing was predatory as
so defined, and even if we assume predatory intent, there is no
evidence that Alderson ever possessed monopoly power. Alderson did not have the power to raise prices or eliminate competitors . . . . [T]he Tax Court has a policy of renewing the court
reporting contract for those who perform satisfactorily and who
are willing to continue at the same price. If the contractor
wishes to raise its prices, the contract goes out for bidding again.
As soon as the contract goes back up for bids, there are numerous other court-reporting companies who can bid and try to undercut the company holding the contract. Alderson could not
control prices, because if it tried to raise its price, the contract
would again be up for bids. Both parties agree that Alderson
could not exclude any company from bidding, and by 1980 there
146. Id. at 1022. The contract in this case was unique in that it was let by the United
States Tax Court, and thus apparently was not subject to standard procurement regulations
and the Competition in Contracting Act, which direct executive agencies to employ procurement procedures that promote full and open competition. See supra note 2; 10 U.S.C. §
2301(b)(1) (Supp. III 1985); 41 U.S.C. § 253a (Supp. III 1985); 48 C.F.R. § 6.101 (1986).
The Tax Court's policy in this case essentially created a "sole-source" procurement, which
generally are prohibited unless certain special circumstances exist. See id. § 6.3.
147. National Reporting, 763 F.2d at 1022.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1023-24. For purposes of the decision, the court accepted a market defined as
"the provision of court-reporting services to the United States Tax Court" - i.e., a one-product, one-contract market. Id. at 1023.
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were several other companies capable of meeting the Tax Court
court-reporting contract requirements. Competition was alive
and well in the relevant market. 5 '

As for attempted monopolization, the Eighth Circuit concluded
that the existence of competition and the very nature of the market,
given the court's policy, precluded any finding of a dangerous
probability of success.' 51 The court of appeals therefore reversed and
remanded the action to the district court with instructions to dismiss
the complaint.
Kirk-Mayer, Inc. v. Pac Ord, Inc. 52 was decided on very similar

facts. The plaintiff was an incumbent contractor for ten years under
a series of exclusive so-called "blue collar" fixed-price contracts to
repair and maintain electronics equipment at a Navy facility in California. These contracts, together with four peripheral ones, were
awarded every three years. Both the plaintiff and the defendant submitted best-and-final offers to the Navy for a follow-on "blue collar"
contract in 1982. The defendant
won the 1982 contract, and plaintiff
53
filed a Section 2 claim.1
The court granted summary judgment for the defendant.1 54 For
purposes of this decision, the court "skeptically" accepted plaintiff's
product market definition, the "blue collar" and all four peripheral
contracts, and its geographic market definition, the fifteen-square
mile area around the Navy facility. 5" This court nonetheless concluded, on the basis of National Reporting, that the defendant
lacked the power to exclude any competitor from bidding on the contract, and, therefore, could not monopolize the market at issue. It
also found that because defendant was incapable of raising its prices
during the contract term, there could never be a dangerous
probability of success sufficient for a finding of attempted
monopolization. 5
Taken together, National Reporting and Kirk-Mayer reveal

that fixed-price contracts ordinarily cannot be challenged successfully on predatory pricing grounds. Those cases demonstrate that "a
government contractor who obtains [a] contract for a fixed term at a
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
n.I.
155.
156.

Id. at 1023.
Id.at 1025.
626 F. Supp. 1168 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
Id. at 1169-70.
Id. at 1169. Plaintiff's Section I claim had previously been dismissed. Id.at 1169
See id. at 1170 and n.2.
Id. at 1170-72.
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fixed price in open bidding against a number of other bidders . . .
does not have the power to control prices or exclude competition." 15
In short, such a contractor has no opportunity to reap the benefits of

predation. 158
The Supreme Court dealt another strong blow to predatory
prici.ng plaintiffs in Matsushita Electric IndustrialCo. v. Zenith Radio Corp. 5 9 In Matsushita, two American manufacturers of television sets alleged that a number of Japanese manufacturers had illegally conspired to drive them from the American television market.
The American firms contended that the Japanese conspiracy consisted of a scheme to fix and maintain artificially high prices for television sets sold in Japan in order to finance sales of television sets in
the United States at artificially low prices. 6 The American firms
contended that this conduct violated both Sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act.
After reviewing the evidence, the district court granted summary judgment for the Japanese manufacturers. The Third Circuit
reversed, concluding that from the available evidence, it could be inferred that the Japanese manufacturers conspired to drive American
manufacturers out of the American market, and that they funded
that conspiracy through supercompetitive pricing in the Japanese
16
market. 1
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Third Circuit.
The Court reasoned that there was no evidence available to rebut the
inference that the Japanese firms independently cut prices simply to
compete in the American market, rather than to restrain trade. The
Court cited a "consensus" among antitrust commentators that
"predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely
successful."' 6 2 Consequently, the Court held that direct evidence of
predatory pricing, rather than mere circumstantial evidence of price
increases by a number of manufacturers in a foreign market, is required to prove a conspiracy under Sections 1 or 2.163 The Court
157. Id.at 1171.
158. See id.at 1172; Liebeler, supra note 48, at 1088.
159. 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986).
160, Id.at 1351.
161. Id.at 1352-54.
162, Id.at 1357-58, citing Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48
U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 268 (1981). Compare Crew, Matsushita v. Zenith, I ANTITRUST II
(1986) (suggesting that "Japanese businessmen have a strong penchant for consensus and a
strong motivation to collaborate with each other, if necessary to prevail against foreign competitors") with Liebeler, supra note 86, at 1068 (discussing the sheer "implausibility" of predatory pricing conspiracies).
163. See 106 S. Ct. at 1352-62.
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concluded that the necessary direct evidence must tend to exclude
the possibility that the Japanese manufacturers cut prices for competitive purposes, and not for the purpose of implementing an illegal
1 6

conspiracy.

6 5 decision, Matsushita increases the evidenLike the Monsanto"

tiary burden for antitrust plaintiffs. Courts now will invariably require direct evidence of predatory pricing conspiracies under Sections 1 and 2 before they will conclude that there have been

violations of law. Successful predatory pricing actions were rare
6 Now, Matsushita makes it extremely
enough prior to Matsushita."'

difficult, if not impossible, for a plaintiff to show that a defendant
has engaged in predatory pricing in violation of Section 2. Moreover,
given the outcomes of National Reporting, Kirk-Mayer, and

Langenderfer, a government contractor should carefully consider
whether a predatory pricing action will have any value at all.
B. Brand-Name Specifications
It is not uncommon for government contract specifications to

call for products or components on a "brand-name or equal" basis.

This involves specifying one manufacturer's product, but permitting
contractors to substitute equivalent products made by other manufacturers. 67 Less frequently, government contracts or specifications
164. See id. at 1360-62.
165. In Spray-Rite Service Co. v. Monsanto Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984), a distributor
alleged that a manufacturer conspired with other distributors to fix resale prices and terminated him for price cutting. The Supreme Court held that an antitrust plaintiff is required to
present evidence that tends to prove the existence of a conspiracy and tends to exclude the
possibility that the manufacturer and distributors were acting independently. Id. at 764. Taken
together, Monsanto and Matsushita indicate that, in order to survive summary judgment, antitrust plaintiffs must show that inferences of conspiracy are as reasonable as inferences of
independent action, or collusive action that could not harm the plaintiff. See Matsushita, 106
S. Ct. at 1357; Garment Dist. Inc., v. Belk Stores Services, Inc., 799 F.2d 905, 908 (4th Cir.
1986).
166. See Liebeler, supra note 48, at 1077-94 (of approximately 55 predatory pricing
cases decided between 1975 and 1986, plaintiffs apparently won just three cases on the
merits).
167. The Federal Acquisition Regulation provides that specifications and purchase descriptions "shall not be written so as to specify a product, or a particular feature of a product,
peculiar to one manufacturer, thereby precluding consideration of a product manufactured by
another company, unless it is determined . . . that the particular feature is essential to the
Government's requirements, and that other companies' similar products . . . would not meet
the minimum requirements for the item." 48 C.F.R. § 10.004(b)(2) (1986); see generally id. §
10.004. See also Richard Hoffman Corp. v. Integrated Bldg. Sys., 610 F. Supp. 19 (N.D. Ill.
1985); supra notes 101-110 and accompanying text.
Claims that brand-name specifications unduly restrict competition frequently arise in
challenges to contract awards filed with the GAO, GSBCA and the courts. Typically, these
claims prove unsuccessful, as an agency must show only that its specifications are necessary to
meet its minimum needs and have a reasonable basis. E.g., Lanier Business Products, Inc.,
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are more restrictive and require use of a particular brand-name
product. In Triple M Roofing Corp. v. Tremco, Inc.,'68 a successful
bidder invoked Section 2 to protest a specification that required use
of a particular manufacturer's roofing material.
Triple M Roofing presented some unusual facts. In that case,
the Georgia Department of Agriculture decided to solicit bids for
roof repairs for a building complex. After some savvy salesmanship
by a representative of a manufacturer of roof repair products, the
Department issued a solicitation for bids which incorporated specifications apparently drafted by the manufacturer. The Department
explicitly informed prospective bidders that no substitute product
could be used as the basis for a bid, or during contract performance,
without the prior consent of the Department. The plaintiff was the
low bidder in response to the solicitation, in part because it based its
bid on the use of a competing, cheaper roof repair product. Consequently, the plaintiff received the contract award. It subsequently
was unsuccessful in its attempts to get the Department to accept a
substitute or to get the manufacturer to discount its product.169
Subsequently, the contractor instituted a Sherman Act action
alleging, inter alia, that the manufacturer had violated Section 2 by
attempting to monopolize the market for roofing materials for the
Department contract. 7 ° The narrow market definition suggested by
the plaintiff apparently was attributable to the fact that the manufacturer possessed a very small share of the roof repair market by
any standard, even when only allegedly comparable roof repair products were considered.17 ' The court held, as discussed earlier, that the
single-contract, single-product market claimed by the contractor was
not "sufficiently 'appreciable' to support a claim under the antitrust
laws.' 7' The court suggested that a government agency's use of
brand-name specifications, standing alone, could never violate the attempt-to-monopolize provision of Section 2:
Agreements whereby a contractor is obliged to employ a
Comp. Gen. B-193693, 79-1 CPD 232.
168. 753 F.2d 242 (2d Cir. 1985).
169. Id. at 244-45.
170. Id. at 245. The plaintiff also claimed that the manufacturer and Department conspired to fix artificially high prices foruse of the manufacturer's products to perform the Department's contract in violation of Section I. Id. The Second Circuit held that the record
supported no inference of price-fixing, and that the brand-name specifications "did not in this
instance compromise free and unfettered competition in the roofing materials industry." Id. at
247-48.
171. The Second Circuit found that the manufacturer possessed 20% of the market for
comparable roof repair products, but only 1.8% of the entire roof repair market. Id. at 244.
172. Id. at 246; see supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
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particular branded product are commonplace, and it has not
been suggested that they ought to be discouraged. In such cases,
the manufacturer of the branded product enjoys "monopoly
power" within the market defined by the individual contract.
But unless a manufacturer's power within such a de minimis

market is the product of power within a larger market (which
fact has not been alleged in this case), we see nothing wrong

with such a "monopolist" charging any price it wishes. The frustrations Triple M may have experienced upon realizing that it
could not secure Tremco products at as low a price as it would

have liked do not implicate the economic concerns
that properly
7
animate the Sherman Act's proscriptions.1 1
It is noteworthy, however, that there apparently was no evidence
in Triple M Roofing of a conspiracy among the manufacturer, the
Department or others to enable the manufacturer to monopolize
some relevant market for roof repair.1 74 Given such evidence and a
more broadly defined market, or a court sympathetic to a single-contract market claim, 75 the plaintiff in Triple M Roofing may have
76
been more fortunate.
C.

Misrepresentation
In certain circumstances, misrepresentations or disparaging re-

173. 753 F.2d at 246.
174. Id. at 247; see supra note 170.
175. E.g., F. Buddie Contracting, Inc. v. Seawright, 595 F. Supp. 422 (N.D. Ohio
1984); see supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
176. See George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970). In Whitten, the court reversed the trial court's
dismissal of plaintiff's complaint and held that a manufacturer, its dealers and representatives
could have conspired to restrain trade in violation of Section 1, and attempted to monopolize
the market for public swimming pools in violation of Section 2, if they obtained the agreement
of or coerced public agencies to adopt the manufacturer's exclusive specifications for swimming pool components. Id. at 36. (In a subsequent opinion, the court found no evidence to
support a conspiracy with the officials and consultants. 508 F.2d 547, 558 & n.19 (Ist Cir.
1974)). The court also held that the defendants' conduct was not a first amendment-protected
attempt to influence government action that rendered the defendants' actions immune from
Sherman Act liability under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Id. at 34. See UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 567 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr, 365 U.S. 127
(1961). The courts are divided concerning whether there is a "commercial activities" exception
to Noerr-Pennington immunity - that is, whether a contractor or other actor may be immune
from Sherman Act liability when it seeks to influence government activities, such as contract
awards and solicitations, that are commercial in nature and do not involve policymaking considerations. For discussions of the case law and appropriate analysis in this area, see, e.g., In re
Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litigation, 693 F.2d 84, 86-88 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462
U.S. 1133 (1983) (no commercial exception); F. Buddie Contracting, Inc. v. Seawright, 595 F.
Supp. 422, 438-39 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (commercial exception applied); COMPACT v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville, 594 F. Supp. 1567, 1572-73 (M.D. Tenn. 1984) (commercial exception exists).
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marks about a competing contractor can constitute grounds for a
Section 2 claim. The case of SJ Advanced Technology & Manufacturing Corp. v. Junkunc'" is instructive in this regard. In Junkunc,
the defendant was the sole-source manufacturer of fuel nozzle seals
or gaskets for many United States military aircraft until 1979. An
employee of defendant formed his own company ("SJ") to manufacture seals at that time. The defendant thereafter communicated with
numerous customers and suppliers of SJ and falsely represented to
them, among other things, that SJ was undercapitalized, could not
produce seals that complied with the applicable military quality assurance standards, and had stolen proprietary material and trade
secrets from the defendant. These misrepresentations caused one potential customer to cease its discussions with SJ. Subsequently, the
Navy awarded SJ a contract for seals, and the defendant again
made similar misrepresentations to cognizant Navy personnel.17
SJ filed a complaint against the defendant that, inter alia, alleged that the misrepresentations constituted an attempt to monopolize the market for seals in violation of Section 2.'1 The defendant
moved to dismiss the antitrust count; the court denied the motion,
holding that SJ had stated an actionable claim. 8 0 The court reasoned that each of the three elements of attempted monopolization
specific intent to monopolize, anticompetitive conduct, and dangerous probability of success in a relevant market - were sufficiently alleged in the complaint to withstand a motion to dismiss.' 8 '
In reviewing SJ's attempted monopolization claim, the court implicitly made two important points. First, the court found that defendant's misrepresentations, if made solely to maintain its solesource status and to prevent SJ from receiving government contracts,
could constitute a valid Section 2 claim. 8 1 Second, the court indicated that, like the Seawright court, it would permit a claim premised upon a fairly narrow market definition to survive dismissal.'
The court in Junkunc accepted a market definition with a geographic market limited to "the Armed Services in the United
177. 627 F. Supp. 572 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
178. Id. at 573-74.
179. Id. at 578. In its complaint, SJ also alleged violations of the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1984), and Section 3 (the
"refusal to deal" provision) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982). Id. at 573.
180. Id. at 578-80.
181. Id. The court, however, dismissed SJ's claim under Section 3 of the Clayton Act
because it was barred by the four-year statute of limitations. Id. at 577-78.
182. See id. at 578.
183. Id.; see F. Buddie Contracting Inc. v. Seawright, 595 F. Supp. 422, 436-38 (N.D.
Ohio 1984) (one government contract can constitute relevant market).
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States" and a product market limited to seals.' 4 This narrow market
definition is consistent with precedent, 8 5 but has been implicitly criticized as a "gerrymandered" one. 18
Junkunc is instructive for government contractors attempting to
break into a new product market. The case illustrates that new entrants, or small contractors with relatively insignificant market
shares, may have a remedy when competitors unfairly or falsely disparage their capabilities or products and thereby inhibit competition.
Although there is relatively little precedent for the theory endorsed
by the court in Junkunc,' 7 it is likely to be employed again in the
future - perhaps, on some occasions, as an alternative to Scanwell
litigation or other forms of "bid protests."
VI.

Conclusion

Although government contractors occasionally may perceive
that they have a valid Sherman Act claim against contract awardees
or other competitors, their chances of success are as slim as they are
before the GAO, the GSBCA, or in an injunctive action in a district
court or the Claims Court. Of the principal cases discussed in this
article, none that has proceeded past the summary judgment stage
apparently has resulted in a victory for the plaintiff. 88 Because of
the relatively small number of challenges that have been brought in
this manner, it is not yet certain how difficult these obstacles will be
to overcome. Until these issues can be definitively resolved, all government contractors should remain aware of their potential protest
options, as well as potential liability, involving the application of the
Sherman Act to this area. 8 9
184. 627 F. Supp. at 578. Cf. Liebeler, supra note 48, at 1062 (suggesting that single
contract or single product market definition likely is a "gerrymandered" one).
185. E.g., Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 498 F. Supp. 1112, I 123 (C.D.
Cal. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 705 F.2d 1030 (9th Cir. 1983); American Standard, Inc.
v. Bendix Corp., 487 F. Supp. 265, 270 (W.D. Mo. 1980); Ovitron Corp. v. General Motors
Corp., 364 F. Supp. 944 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 512 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1975).
186. See Liebeler, supra note 48, at 1062. For an interesting analysis of the market
definition issue in government contracts-related Section 2 cases, see McMillan, supra note 74,
at 690-97.
187. The Federal Trade Commission has held that false disparagement of a competitor's
product or service can violate Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45a (1982). See E.B.
Muller & Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1944); Perma-Maid Co. v. FTC, 121 F.2d 282
(6th Cir. 1941).
188. National Reporting Co. v. Alderson Reporting Co., 763 F.2d 1020 (8th Cir. 1985)
(defendant did not possess monopoly power and there was no dangerous probability of success
of defendant's alleged attempt to monopolize); Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson
Co., 729 F.2d 1050 (6th Cir.) (no finding of any conduct that could have supported a monopolization or attempted monopolization claim), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984).
189. Violations of Section I or Section 2 of the Sherman Act can result in liability for
treble damages. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).

